Keeping our Surveillance Society Non-Totalitarian by Jacobs, B.






The following full text is a publisher's version.
 
 





Please be advised that this information was generated on 2017-12-06 and may be subject to
change.
amsterdam lawfor u m




In 2006 the United Kingdom information commissioner Richard Thomas 
warned that we are “sleepwalking into a surveillance society”. He referred to 
the increased recording and monitoring of people’s behaviour, for instance 
via security cameras, various smart cards (for identification, loyalty, access, 
transport), data retention for (mobile) phone and email communication, 
automatic number plate recognition (ANPR), radio frequency identification 
(RFID), biometric verification and identification, and so forth. The 
introduction of these relatively new techniques and measures has been a 
gradual process, proceeding in small steps, each with its own rationality, but 
whose cumulative effect has brought us into a surveillance society, as is also 
argued by OHarrow and Murakami Wood.1 This article will sketch the 
development and characteristics of this surveillance society, especially in 
relation to computer security, privacy and autonomy. The phrase 
‘surveillance society’ will be used in a morally neutral manner, intended to 
capture a characteristic of modern, technologically advanced societies.
Surveillance societies have mechanisms for monitoring, influencing and 
controlling people in their private lives. These mechanisms may be used for 
commercial, political or security reasons. In case the authorities actively use 
these mechanisms to monitor, influence and control people in their private 
lives on a large scale, the term ‘totalitarian society’ will be used, in line with 
the terminology of Hannah Arendt.2 Hence totalitarianism does not refer to 
brutal, physical suppression — this is what Arendt associates with tyranny — 
but to the interference with personal affairs. There is no sharp boundary 
between (passive) monitoring and (active) influencing/controlling, since 
knowing that you are being monitored in your private life has, in general, 
implicit influence on your behaviour.3 However, for the purposes of this 
paper, deliberately exerting explicit influence and control in private lives is 
considered part of the idea of a totalitarian society, not of a surveillance 
society. One may argue that a transformation of a surveillance society into a 
totalitarian society is primarily a matter of politics, not of technology. It is
* M.Math., M .Phil, Sc.D. (Nijmegen), www.cs.ru.nl/BJacobs. The author would, like to thank colleagues 
Marcel Becker, Jaap-Henk Hoepman, James McKinna and Wouter Teepe for their helpful critical 
comments..
1 R. O H arrow  Jr., N o  Place to Hide, N ew  York: Free Press 2005; D. M urakami W ood, editor, 
A  Report on the Surveillance Society, U K  Inform ation C om m issioner’s Office 2006. 
h ttp ://w w w .ico .gov .uk /up load /docum en ts/lib ra ry /data  protection/practical application 
/ surveillance society full report 2006.pdf (accessed on  24 August 2009).
2 H. A rendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, N ew  York: Schocken Books 1951.
3 M etaphorically, m onitoring o f  private life is like m easurem ent in (non-classical) quantum  
physics: it changes the state o f  the system being observed.
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not so easy to say that once the tools for easily exerting influence are in place, 
the threshold for using them becomes lower. Hence it becomes an issue itself 
whether or not we should introduce tools that can be abused easily in the 
first place, and if so, under what (technological) restrictions and safeguards.
This paper is to a large extent descriptive in nature. But it does make a moral 
stand: it discusses regulations and techniques to reduce (or mitigate) 
monitoring of private lives, and to resist influence and control. The 
mechanisms of a surveillance society are extremely useful in totalitarian 
societies. The issue of potential abuse is thus a serious one that will have to 
be faced explicitly. Preventing our surveillance societies from becoming 
totalitarian is one of the major challenges of our time. The emergence of 
populist movements in Europe, with their limited care for fundamental civil 
rights, may be seen as making this matter more urgent. However, these 
political developments are left outside the scope of this article. Rather, the 
focus will be on regulation and use of technology itself, via five concrete 
guidelines that may be summarised as: ‘select before you collect’, 
‘decentralised storage of personal information’, ‘revocable privacy’, ‘attributes 
instead of identities’, and ‘reactive, non-proactive policing’.4
I. Computer Security, Privacy and Architecture
Computers have a deep influence on our society, via our dependence on 
electronics in general, in particular PCs, mobile phone and digital databases. 
We have become dependent on easy communication and storage of digital 
information, and on efficient mechanisms for searching and recognising 
patterns in large databases. Also, we have realised that in many situations 
such information needs to be properly protected, for instance in relation to 
national security, commercial or personal interests. The (sub)discipline of 
computer security focuses on the regulation of access to digital assets. 
Privacy can be seen as an intrinsic part of computer security, as far as it 
concerns techniques for the protection of personal information. O f course, 
privacy is a much broader topic.5
Information could be protected by putting it in a safe and dumping it to the 
bottom of the ocean, however this makes access a bit difficult. Regulation of 
access means that the ‘good guys’ can get access to the (protected) assets, but 
the ‘bad guys’ cannot. In computer security encryption (or encipherment) of 
data makes data unreadable: it corresponds to the storage of information in a 
safe box. Encryption cryptographic keys are parameters, which are 
(functionally) comparable to physical keys for safe boxes. These 
cryptographic keys are very large numbers. They are far too large to 
remember and are typically stored in the protected memory of chip cards. 
They are used to encipher or decipher data. Modern, computerised 
encryption of data is so complex that it can be regarded as practically 
irreversible, unless you possess the appropriate cryptographic key.
4 See Section VI.
5 See also Section III.
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An important aspect of computer security is key distribution: making sure 
that the good guys possess the appropriate cryptographic keys, and the bad 
guys don’t. As a result, it is important to know who is accessing information. 
Typically one distinguishes the following three aspects:
- identification: telling who you are, for instance via your family name, login 
name, bank account number, passport number, social security number, et 
cetera.;
- authentication: proving who you are, for instance via a (physical) key, a 
password, a PIN, an official document, or a biometric (like a finger print, 
or iris scan);
- authorisation: deciding who is allowed to do what.
Traditionally, computer professionals have been the architects of the digital 
world. Increasingly, they are also architects of the social world. Information 
is power: the one who has most access to information also has most power 
to exercise influence (over others). The information architecture of a 
computer system determines the flow of information and thus who sees 
what, and which information is protected. Computer security issues and 
concerns about privacy and societal division of power meet at this point. 
Mitchell Kapor is one of the founders and the first chairman of the 
Electronic Freedom Foundation (EFF), an international non-profit 
organisation that aims to defend civil rights in the digital age. He has coined 
the phrase ‘architecture is politics’.6
Here is a concrete example. Many countries are considering replacing their 
flat road taxes with a form of road pricing based on actual road usage. Cars 
are then equipped with special devices containing GPS functionality, to 
determine a car’s location, and GSM functionality, for communication. An 
obvious ‘centralised’ architecture requires that these devices send location 
information to a central database, say once every minute. Based on this 
information bills can be calculated and sent to car owners. An alternative 
‘decentralised’ architecture keeps this (privacy sensitive) location information 
in the car and requires that the devices themselves calculate the bill, based on 
a tariff map. In the first architecture the (road pricing) authorities can 
monitor the whereabouts of all individual cars in detail, whereas in the 
second architecture they cannot. This clearly involves more than just a 
technical choice, as is also argued by De Jonge and Jacobs.7 Computer 
architectures thus have social and moral significance: they are not value-free.
6 See also L. Lessig, The Future of Ideas, N ew  York: Vintage 2001.
7 W. de Jonge & B. Jacobs, ‘Privacy-friendly electronic traffic pricing via com m its’, in P. 
D egano, J. G uttm an, and F. Martinelli, editors, Formal Aspects in Security and Trust, num ber 
5491 in Lect. N otes Comp. Sci., pp. 143 - 161. Berlin: Springer, 2009; and B. Jacobs, 
‘Architecture is politics: Security and privacy issues in transport and beyond’, 2009: 
h ttp ://w w w .cs.ru .n l/~ bart/P A P E R S /cpdp09-jacobs.pdf (accessed on 24 August 2009).
22 KEEPING OUR SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY NON-TOTALITARIAN 2009
II. Individual Autonomy
The modern idea of the individual, for instance since Kant, is that people are 
simply autonomous and free, within reasonable bounds, to take their own 
decisions. Modern democratic societies are built on this view. This section 
illustrates that the situation is not so simple and that in practice states have 
an essential role in shaping and safeguarding this individual autonomy — even 
increasingly so with the growing importance of technology. In brief, this 
section revolves around the following two points: (1) individual autonomy is 
fragile and vulnerable, and (2) democratic societies have various mechanisms 
to protect this autonomy. These points will be illustrated by three examples.
11.1 Voting
The voting systems in democracies are regulated by precise laws. 
Interestingly, developments towards electronic forms of voting, via 
computers in poll stations or via the internet, have led to a renewed 
investigation of the underlying principles, including vote freedom, vote 
secrecy, and verifiability of voting.8 These laws and principles protect people 
and almost ‘force’ them to make an autonomous choice. For instance, poll 
stations are protected environments where political messages and 
advertisements are not allowed. There are separate voting booths, in which 
only one person at a time can enter to cast a vote on one’s own without any 
influence from outside. Also, people do not get any form of proof of how 
they voted, in order to prevent coercion or buying of votes. Apparently 
democratic societies think that such protection of individual autonomy is 
needed.9
11.2 Advertising
In marketing it is not very effective to send bulk advertisements to every 
possible customer. Experience shows that it has little effect to advertise 
expensive cars in poor neighbourhoods. Targeting works much better, 
whereby specific advertisements are sent only to specific groups or 
individuals. The combination of surveillance of individuals and marketing 
leads to ‘behavioural targeting’. Information about your behaviour — which 
programs you watch, which websites you visit, where you live and travel, 
what and where you buy, how much you earn, save and spend — is important 
input to compile a personal profile of you. Such a profile can be used to send 
you very specific, focused advertisements, which can be worded in a style 
that is assumed to appeal to you. These advertisements may even use price 
differentiation, so that the price that is presented to you depends on your 
financial situation (or behaviour). Some people get irritated, others see it as a
8 See for example the recom m endation adopted by the Council o f  Europe, ‘Legal, 
operational and technical standards for e-voting’, Septem ber 2004. R ecom m endation Rec 
(2004)11 adopted by the Com m ittee o f  M inisters o f  the Council o f  Europe, with 
explanatory m em orandum : h ttps://w cd.coe.in t/V iew D oc.jsp?id=778189 (accessed on 24 
A ugust 2009).
9 In  postal voting or voting via the internet many o f  these protection  m echanism s are no t 
present and so the risk o f  w hat is called ‘family fraud’ is m uch higher. This is seen as a 
serious disadvantage o f  such forms o f  rem ote voting.
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helpful service, and others are simply not able to resist well-targeted 
seductions. Already a certain percentage of the population cannot cope with 
aggressive advertisements, such as for commercial loans, leading to political 
debate: for example, in 2006 Dutch parliament discussed banning aggressive 
loan advertisements, but in the end it did not happen. It may be expected 
that with the growth in behavioural targeting additional regulation is needed 
to protect individual autonomy.
II.3 Interrogation
Without going into specifics of particular countries, several miscarriages of 
justice have been attributed to the way police interrogations are conducted. 
Apparently, people can be influenced to confess to crimes that they did not 
commit. This shows the fragility of individual autonomy. In response to such 
miscarriages of justice additional protection mechanisms have been called 
for, ranging from videotaping of police interrogations to (earlier) presence of 
defence lawyers.
III. Privacy
Privacy is a broad topic that is traditionally studied in legal and ethical 
literature.10 It is under pressure in our surveillance society, especially when it 
concerns the increased focus on public security after the 9/11 attacks. 
Privacy is construed as an obstacle to public security, notably in phrases like: 
“if you have nothing to hide, you have nothing to fear” .11 However, while 
privacy is essential for personal security it is a soft value that is relatively hard 
to defend. The way privacy is understood often only involves the issue as to 
whether or not others learn about or monitor your behaviour (cf. Big 
Brother). But when passive monitoring turns into active influencing and 
controlling, autonomy and freedom of interference is also at stake (cf. Kafka). 
The two notions of privacy and autonomy are closely related.
In our lives we are all involved in different roles: for example at work, in 
church, in the pub, in hospital, at home, or in a social (online) network. 
Associated with each role is a special context or sphere in which certain 
information may be relevant, in one way or another, depending on the 
context. Privacy may be best understood, in a fairly concrete way, as 
individual control over the exchange of information between one’s own 
different roles in society.
Some people choose to have fairly little separation between these roles, and 
make for instance much of their personal life public in a social network or in 
online blogs. In this case they are still in control. Learning how to exercise 
such control over personal information is becoming an integral part of
10 See for example Schoeman, w ho provided an overview: F. Schoeman, editor, Philosophical 
Dimensions of Privacy. A n  Anthology, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1984.
11 D.J. Solove, ‘“I ’ve got nothing to hide” and other m isunderstandings o f  privacy’, San 
Diego Law Review, 44, 2007. G W U Law School Public Law Research Paper N o. 289: 
h ttp ://ssrn .co m /ab strac t= 9 9 8 5 6 5  (accessed on 24 A ugust 2009).
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growing up, as can be seen with youngsters who experience that putting too 
much information online can harm them or make them vulnerable.
Suppose you have a Pay-TV subscription. The company involved will 
typically keep track of which films you watch, if only to compile a bill.12 The 
information of what you watch in your private home environment is thus 
stored somewhere else outside your control. The database containing who- 
viewed-what-where-and-when may become public, as a result of hacking, or 
negligence. Maybe some acquaintance works for the TV company and can 
look up in the database what you watch. This reduced informational control, 
if you are aware of it, probably feels like a loss of privacy. Is it also a loss of 
autonomy? That depends on you. D o you still switch on an embarrassing or 
controversial film (say with Nazi or communist or fundamentalist 
propaganda) if you know that this fact will be added to your personal 
customer profile and may become known to others, beyond your control? 
Pay-TV companies are usually not very explicit about this monitoring and 
profiling of their clients. At most they mention it in the small print in terms 
of “collecting information to improve our level of service to individual 
customers” .
Via such surveillance mechanisms, information about what we do in one 
specific context is stored somewhere else, outside this context and outside 
our own control. This may apply to an online shop, or to your local library or 
video rental or a supermarket that keeps track of what you buy via 
membership or loyalty cards. Banks and telecommunication companies also 
store lots of sensitive personal information. In presence of data retention 
laws the information is kept longer than commercially needed.
Alternative decentralised architectures with local, in-context, storage of 
sensitive information do exist but have been hardly explored or used in 
practice. They reduce the power of the service providers (and authorities) 
and require more involvement and effort of individuals. In the end, it is of 
course a matter of whether we care enough to handle our data ourselves, and 
if so, if we manage to convince or (democratically) force organisations to 
switch to such decentralised architectures.
IV. Data Mining
12 It is no t really necessary that the com pany keeps track o f  what you watch. I t  can also be 
organised that you keep track o f  this data yourself, in a fraud resistant m anner. For 
instance, the com pany may send you a statem ent, each time you view a movie, digitally 
signed by (devices of) b o th  you and the company. The statem ent may say that you viewed 
this movie at such-and-such time, and keep only a hash o f  this signed statem ent itself, 
together with a cumulative bill. In  case o f  a dispute about the bill, you will have to produce 
the pre-images to these hashes, which can be checked by the company. There are however 
very few incentives for a Pay-TV com pany to introduce such a privacy-friendly, 
decentralised architecture.
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Computerised handling and monitoring of our daily transactions yields 
enormous databases containing our digital footprints. Powerful, query-based 
search techniques make it possible to extract pieces of information that are 
relevant for a specific purpose —  as with Google. A different, more holistic 
form of analysis of such vast amounts of data is called ‘data mining’. It 
involves the large scale, automated statistical analysis of data. Roughly 
speaking, data mining can be used in two different ways, namely to test an 
already existing hypothesis, or to discover new relationships between data 
elements. It is important to note that data mining only yields statistical 
patterns, and no causal relationships.
Here is a simple example. Suppose that a (grocery) shop keeper wants to 
know which products are often sold together, so that she can put them closer 
together on the shelves in her shop, with the idea that customers who buy 
one product are possibly tempted to also buy the other one. Data mining can 
help in such a situation: first, one compiles a substantial collection of lists of 
products bought by individual customers (whose identities do not matter 
here). Then one searches these lists, one by one, while counting the 
occurrences of all possible pairs of products. This may yield obvious pairs of 
products with frequent occurrences, like taco chips and chilli sauce, less 
obvious ones like bean soup and toilet paper, or strange combinations like 
dog food and French blue cheese. Unexpected patterns may emerge, without 
any clear causal connection or explanation. Still they may be useful, 
commercially.
Via data mining new, high-level information can be extracted. For instance, 
supermarkets can find out, through their loyalty cards, when their female 
customers have their periods. When one analyses individual shopping data 
spanning many years one expects that a (statistical) pattern emerges, since 
female customers are more likely to buy feminine hygiene products during 
certain periods in a month. This information could be used for timely, 
personal advertisement. However, it would probably shock many customers 
if such personal information was exploited so openly, precisely because it 
forms a privacy breach: information from one (intimate) sphere is used in 
quite another one, without consent. Supermarkets apparently respect the 
privacy of their (female) customers by not extracting and using this kind of 
information. But the information is in principle available out of context. 
Similarly, mobile phone companies know which of their (male) customers 
frequent prostitute areas. It is also unlikely that this information will be 
exploited commercially. Many more examples, ranging from political micro­
targeting to personality grouping in dating services are described by Baker 
(without much reflection).13
The information obtained via data mining is often not 100% reliable. This is 
not so problematic in a commercial context when it results in a mistargeted 
advertisement. But when a mortgage is denied to you purely based on a data
13 S. Baker, The Numerati, Boston, N ew  York: H ough ton  Mifflin Comp. 2008.
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mining analysis you may feel unfairly disadvantaged and demand to know 
precisely what is going on. That is why the European directive 95 /46 /E C 14 
forbids that such decisions are made purely automatically and requires 
human intervention. However, in practice this is problematic.15
Data mining can thus uncover hidden patterns that can be used to compose 
profiles of individuals. These patterns/profiles may be used a posteriori 
(reactively) or a priori (proactively), in an anticipatory manner. An example of 
the first use is credit card fraud detection: if your profile says ‘European 
traveller, small expenses’ and your card is suddenly used for a big transaction 
in Bangkok, alarms are raised and the transaction may be blocked.16 In this 
case the ‘act’ (of buying something in Bangkok) takes place — or is at least 
initiated — and triggers a reaction. Profiles are used proactively, if the ‘act’ is 
prevented from happening in the first place. Examples include when you 
were denied a loan because your profile indicated that you are a high risk 
candidate, or when you are not allowed to board a plane, because your 
profile says ‘potential terrorist’ (no local but many international phone calls, 
recent visit to Pakistan, you ordered an halal meal and an aisle seat, and so 
forth.).
An important aspect of (European style) privacy laws is that people have the 
right to inspect what information on them is stored, and to require correction 
or even deletion under certain circumstances. These laws were written at a 
time when data mining was still in its infancy. It is not clear whether the right 
to inspection only applies to the stored personal data itself, or also to the 
derived personal profiles, or even to the selection mechanisms that are used 
in data mining. After all, in many situations it is quite reasonable that you 
have a right to know the rules that are used in data mining and in blocking or 
stimulating certain behaviour on your part. Such knowledge is quite relevant 
for fair and possibly effective forms of appeal.17
IV.1 Data M ining for Public Security
Police and intelligence services are beginning to use data mining as a tool in 
public/national security. This is controversial, partly because of association 
with ‘precrime’, as in the film Minority Report (2002), in which a special 
police unit prevents criminal acts before they happen by pre-emptive arrests 
based on intentions (knowledge of which is obtained via ‘precogs’). This is 
not far from reality because there is for example a new development in 
policing in the Netherlands to take selected people briefly into custody 
before major events, like high-risk football matches or visits of heads of 
states, based on profiling.
14 See especially articles 12 and 15 (Directive 9 5 /4 6 /E C ).
15 M. H ildebrandt, Profiling and the rule o f  law, Identity in Information Society (IDIS), 1, 2008. 
h t tp : / / ssrn.com/abstra.ct=1.3.32076 (accessed on 24 A ugust 2009).
16 In  practice these fraud m echanisms have so m any false negatives today that the credit 
card itself is no longer a reliable means to pay.
17 See for further discussion: A. V edder, K D D : ‘The challenge to individualism’, Ethics and 
Inf. Technol., 1(4): pp. 275 — 281, 1999; and H ildebrandt (2008), supra note 15.
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Data mining and profiling involves many statistical uncertainties, which are 
only aggravated when the databases are polluted and contain errors. This is 
often the case, possibly resulting in a propagation of errors. But in public 
security both false positives (the good guy is seen as bad) and false negatives 
(the bad guy is not detected) are unacceptable. Once you are flagged as ‘bad’ 
the presumption of innocence (you are innocent unless proven guilty) may 
no longer be distinct. The burden of proof may be put on you, to show you 
are not guilty, instead of on the police authorities, to build up a case that you 
are guilty.
After the 9/11 attacks data mining was seen as one of the promising tools to 
detect potential terrorists early on, before they would strike. After some years 
the enthusiasm has faded away. A recent critical report by the U.S. National 
Academies involving many experts and stakeholders has advised against the 
technique: there is too much data (needle in the haystack problem), which is 
often ‘soft’ and unreliable, there are too few clear signs of terrorist activities, 
and there are too many ways for terrorists to generate obfuscating and 
misleading signals. Data mining is not the way to find an extremely small, 
well-hidden group in an extremely large population.18
V. Surveillance Society Characteristics
The brief anatomy of a surveillance society in this paper has focused on the 
following three characteristics.
1. Being free increasingly requires being shameless. In principle, the extensive 
monitoring that characterises a surveillance society does not force you to 
behave in a certain way. You are, in principle, still free to make your own 
choices, as long as you do not care about the fact that the resulting behaviour 
is being monitored and leads to information storage out of context. If  you 
don’t care that other people know that you watch (say) adult films, via your 
Pay-TV subscription or via IP-addresses stored at online servers, you quite 
happily and freely switch them on. But if you do feel ashamed, the 
(knowledge of the) fact that you are being monitored may inhibit you.
Interestingly, certain religions describe God as all-seeing, often with possible 
disciplinary consequences, in the hereafter or already in this life. The intimate 
relationship between panopticism and discipline was studied by French 
philosopher Michel Foucault in his writings on prisons.19 The panopticon 
style prisons designed by Jeremy Bentham may serve as model for society as 
a whole, where citizens are becoming transparent and are monitored
18 Com m ittee on Technical and Privacy D im ensions o f  Inform ation for Terrorism  
Prevention and O ther N ational Goals, N ational Research Council, Protecting Individual 
Privacy in the Struggle against Terrorists, W ashington: The N ational Academies Press, 2008.
19 Foucault w rote about the whole prison system as a way o f  keeping control o f  unw anted 
elements in society, see M. Foucault. Surveiller et punir: Naissance de la prison. Gallimard, Paris, 
1975. Translated as: Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison.
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constantly, but are never sure whether their digital traces are actually 
inspected or not.
2. There is no clear separation between passive monitoring on the one hand 
and active influencing and controlling on the other. Data mining techniques 
make it possible to extract hidden patterns from information obtained from 
monitoring. These patterns are easily used, both reactively and proactively, to 
steer behaviour in a certain direction. Often the patterns are extracted exactly 
for this reason. This disciplinary effect may take the form of self-censorship: 
when you know that certain behaviour patterns will trigger a reaction, and 
thus hassle (“step out of the line, please, and come with us”), you may decide 
to behave in a more conformist manner. The greater the uncertainty about 
what precisely is stored in your profile and triggers a reaction, the greater the 
fear and tendency towards conformism. Conformism is however not what 
has made western societies excel (industrially or scientifically, for instance).
3. In case political power in a surveillance society falls into the wrong hands 
of (internal or external) parties with malicious intentions, they will be happy 
to find many surveillance tools standing ready for totalitarian use. Historically 
the most prominent example is the effective use that Nazis made of citizen 
administrations in continental Europe to single out Jews. Current tools offer 
far more options for controlling the population, as can be seen in several 
countries today.
VI. Controlling Surveillance
Are we sleepwalking into a totalitarian society? Is there an unstoppable and 
inevitable process? The main concern is of course to make sure that power 
does not come into the wrong hands, namely of those who want to 
deliberately use it to maliciously control and suppress the population. But 
maybe a totalitarian society emerges in just the same way that the surveillance 
society arose: in small steps, each of which was understandable from a 
narrow perspective and not completely devoid of rationality. Each further 
optimisation of the surveillance society allows us to detect and catch more 
bad guys, to prevent crimes from happening in the first place by extensive 
profiling of the entire population and pre-emptive arrests or other 
interventions, and to reduce the overall risk. Maybe a new totalitarian society 
provides a safe and comfortable environment for the majority, in which we 
will be shameless enough to feel sufficiently free, in which profiling is never 
explicit and individual behaviour is steered primarily via personalised 
seduction, and in which the authorities behave like omniscient parents and 
will not openly abuse their power, at least not against the conformist 
majority. Is this realistic, and do we want such a society? With each further 
optimisation of the surveillance society we accept more monitoring and 
control, and implicitly express faith in all future governments.
The incident-driven focus on functionality of surveillance mechanisms makes 
it difficult to see the bigger picture and to develop a vision of what is going 
on and of where we want to go. One aim of this paper is to try and snap out
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of the sleepwalking, by presenting some building blocks that could form part 
of a more conscious and controlled (and dignified) form of surveillance 
society. Some of such building blocks are presented below, as possible 
alternatives.
VI.1 Select before you Collect
Traditionally in a state of law one first has to become a ‘suspect’ before 
certain surveillance restrictions can be lifted in lawful investigations, 
including phone tapping, searches, information seizure. Hence the traditional 
order is: first select (a suspect), then collect (information). Increasingly this 
order is reversed and information is collected first (about everyone), and 
subjects to be investigated are selected later. The clearest example20 is the 
European directive 2006/24/EC, on telecommunications data retention 
which prescribes that all ‘traffic data’, capturing who communicates with 
whom and when and where (but not the content) of all 450M European 
citizens have to be stored for a fixed period of time.21 This is the surveillance 
society at work. Bowden wrote: “Traffic data constitutes a near complete 
map of private life: whom everyone talks to (by e-mail and phone), where 
everyone goes (mobile phone location co-ordinates), and what everyone 
reads online (websites browsed). At present, the geographic coordinates of a 
mobile phone can be tracked to within a few hundred meters whilst the 
phone is switched on. The new 3G (third generation) phones will pinpoint 
location to a few meters”.22 Apart from privacy concerns, such a ‘collect 
before you select’ approach is problematic because it treats everyone as a 
possible suspect. The data retention directive is highly controversial, and is 
contested in constitutional courts, for instance in Germany.
Sticking to the ‘select before you collect’ principle is an important aspect of 
limiting surveillance and limiting the possible options for abuse.23 Data may 
be collected and stored about selected people, if there is a proper reason, but 
blanket collection of data without any reason (yet) is to be avoided.
One objection to such a limitation of blanket collection is that the selection 
of suspects becomes more difficult. But in practice, this does not seem to be 
a real problem. It seems that in almost all the publicly known terrorist attacks
20 But there are m ore examples: some countries, like the N etherlands, are planning to store 
finger prints o f  all citizens with a passport (criminal or not) in a central database that is 
accessible for law enforcem ent.
21 A t least half a year and at m ost 2 years; m em ber states can choose the exact retention 
period themselves; m any o f  them  choose at least one year. A n evaluation o f  the directive is 
foreseen in 2010.
22 C. Bowden, ‘Closed circuit television for inside your head: Blanket traffic data retention 
and the emergency anti-terrorism  legislation’, Computer and Telecomm, Law Review, 2002. 
Available from  D uke Law & Techn. Review, 
h ttp ://w w w .law .duke .edu /jou rna ls/d ltr/ articles72002dltr0005.html (accessed on 24 
August 2009).
23 B. Jacobs, ‘Select before you collect’, A rs  Aequi, pp. 1006 — 1009, D ecem ber 2005 (in 
Dutch): h ttp ://w w w .cs.ru .n l/B .Jacobs/PA PE R S/jacobs-arsaequi-dec05 .pdf (accessed on
24 A ugust 2009).
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(or attempts) the terrorists involved were known to, and often even under 
surveillance of, the police and intelligence communities, before investigative 
powers as in the data retention directive existed. The signs may not have 
been interpreted correctly, but that is another matter. Also, as shown in the 
report ‘Protecting Individual Privacy in the Struggle against Terrorists’24 
mining in large scale databases is not the proper way to find terrorists. 
Selection involves human (police) work, based on skills and experience. It 
involves more human intelligence (humint) than ‘signals intelligence’ (also 
known as sigint).
VI.2 Decentralise Data Storage
Centralised databases full of privacy sensitive information may be attractive 
for the database owners (or the authorities), but are not necessarily attractive 
for the subjects involved. Concerns exist about the ‘information is power’ 
issue and about the large number of data loss incidents,25 making incidents 
structural. New models and architectures are needed to handle such sensitive 
information, together with the political will and societal pressure to introduce 
them. In Section III privacy has been described in terms of control over 
exchange of ones own personal information between different spheres in 
ones life. The ability to keep personal information within the original context 
is thus important for privacy. This requires (new) architectures for 
decentralised storage of data, as in the road pricing example at the end of 
Section I. Another recent, controversial example is the introduction of 
electronic electricity/gas/water meters in private homes, which regularly 
transmit, every 15 minutes for instance, the usage levels to a central server at 
the utility company. This involves a move in the opposite direction, from 
local, decentralised storage in traditional meters, to centralised storage via 
electronic meters.
Decentralised storage can be done using smart cards, like in the German 
health card Gesundheidskarte that stores an abstract of the medical record of 
the card owner. Other personal devices, like phones or PDAs, can also be 
used. But the physical location of the information is not so important — it 
may be anywhere on a grid networks long as it is encrypted and the required 
cryptographic keys are controlled by the data subject. By the use of 
appropriate digital signatures it can be ensured that the data is authentic, so 
that local tampering is not possible (or at least is detectable). These 
decentralised architectures may be flexible, so that people also have the 
option to store their personal data in the traditional centralised way, but the 
important point is that they should be able to choose this themselves — in 
line with the concept of privacy as informational self-determinacy.
VI.3 Revocable Privacy
24 N ational Research Council (2008), supra note 18.
25 See for instance h ttp ://d a ta lo ssd b .o rg / for overviews (accessed on 24 August 2009).
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The idea behind car number plates — before automatic number plate 
recognition — is that you can drive around reasonably anonymously, but if 
you violate a law, bystanders or police officers can write down your number 
plate and look up who you are. This may be seen as an example of revocable 
privacy. There are modern, digital versions of this idea. The most famous 
one is digital cash as proposed in ‘Untraceable electronic cash’26: digital coins 
are big numbers with the identity of the coin-owner embedded arithmetically. 
The problem with such coins — like with any digital datum — is that they can 
be copied arbitrarily many times. But the system is designed in a clever way 
so that a certain check takes place when you spend a coin, in such a way that 
(only) upon double spending of a coin, the embedded identity pops up, via a 
clever calculation with these numbers/coins.
The essence of revocable privacy is to design systems in such a way that no 
personal information is collected centrally, unless a user violates a pre­
established policy. Only in that case, personal information (and violation 
details) are revealed to the authorities. Privacy protection is thus not an add­
on but is built deeply into the architecture of the system, and does not rely 
on legal or procedural safeguards that can be changed or circumvented 
relatively easily. Revocable privacy is in line with the ‘select before you 
collect’ adagium from Subsection VI.1 and may be a way to (partly) reconcile 
the justifiable interests of law enforcement and privacy protection.
VI.4 Attributes instead of identities
Section I described the three notions of identification, authentication and 
authorisation. Many forms of authorisation do not require identification (and 
authentication), but only ‘attributes’, such as being over 18, having a valid 
ticket, being a citizen of a particular country, and so forth. Often such 
attributes are related to an identity, but such a connection is not strictly 
necessary. If  you need to prove that you are over 18, for instance in a liquor 
shop, by showing an identity card, you give away much more information 
than strictly necessary, certainly if this card can be read electronically — and 
all your personal data can be joined with your stored purchase history. This 
additional information, including possibly your social security number, can be 
abused in various way, leading to what is called identity fraud. In the digital 
age identity-poor solutions27 are needed, involving for instance electronic 
attributes that are digitally signed by appropriate authorities.
Unfortunately, the move is still in the other direction. For instance with the 
introduction of smart card-based ticketing in public transport, travelling has 
suddenly become identity-based (see also Jacobs).28 These smart cards have a 
fixed identity, that shows up every time you use it. In many cases it is
26 D . Chaum, A. Fiat & M. N aor. ‘Untraceable electronic cash’, in S. Goldwasser, editor, 
CRYPTO  1988, num ber 403 in Lect. N otes Comp. Sci., pp. 319—327. Berlin : Springer 
1988.
27 I.e. to be understood  literally: involving as little identity inform ation as needed.
28 Jacobs (2009), supra note 7.
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connected to a personal identity — or can easily be linked to an identity, for 
instance via payment logs.
VI.5 Reactive Policing only
Section IV has described the controversial character of data mining, in 
particular in relation to public security. After the Second World War most 
European countries did not want their intelligence services to be a secret 
policy (like the Gestapo of the Nazis). As a result, the intelligence community 
is organised differently from the police, without the power to arrest, but with 
more extensive information gathering powers, focused on forces that 
threaten the constitutional order. Hence it is natural that they make cautious 
use of data mining to uncover hidden patterns (while applying the highest 
information security standards to the sensitive data in their custody). For the 
police services this is less self-evident: in essence they are a reactive force, 
that takes action when the law is violated. There is pressure to make police 
work more proactive. This is uncontroversial when it comes to advising on 
safety precautions in homes, but active use of pattern-based data mining and 
developing personal profiles of all citizens is a different matter. Given the 
low threshold of errors and abuse in data mining, the combination with the 
operational powers of the police is not a fortunate one, since it involves 
extensive monitoring (and control) of private lives and may precipitate the 
move towards a totalitarian society. In a surveillance society there is an 
abundance of data that police officers can use reactively (and selectively, see 
Subsection VI.1.), in their investigations.
This subsection thus concludes with a simple but far reaching proposal: 
intelligence services should be allowed to use pattern-based data mining, for 
their restricted task, but police forces should not. O f course, this data mining 
should be used with a proper understanding of its pitfalls and limitations.29
Conclusion
The mechanisms for monitoring and controlling people are becoming so 
powerful that we need to ‘stop and think’ in order to slow-down the 
incident-driven focus on functionality and to develop a robust vision, if we 
wish to continue to protect individual autonomy, not only against aggressive 
commercial parties but also against over-active states that believe in blanket, 
non-selective monitoring and pre-emptive intervention. A broad vision, 
involving among other things a demarcation between surveillance societies 
and totalitarian societies, is not developed here. However building blocks for 
such a vision are sketched, with emphasis on selectivity, decentralised, in­
context storage of privacy sensitive data, via architectures guaranteeing 
revocable privacy and attribute-based authorisation, and limiting the use of 
data mining and pro-active policing for public security. The ‘positive’ use of 
technology in order to protect privacy and autonomy is essential for this 
approach. It requires that we stop sleepwalking, become more aware of the
29 See N ational Research Council (2008), supra note 18.
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values involved in the design of technologies, and make some conscious and 
transparent choices.
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